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I. INTRODUCTION
Five months ago, a major health maintenance organization ("HMO") was
notified by the State of Illinois that it would not be a health plan option for state
employees in the upcoming plan year.' Affected by this decision were not only
the doctors, nurses, support staff, and clerical workers of the HMO in question,
but also some 90,000 state workers and retirees.2 These current and former
employees would need to switch to one of the other health plan options, in some
cases ending doctor-patient relationships that had existed for two or three
decades or longer.
What precipitated this dramatic turn of events was not some outpouring of
dissatisfaction with this specific HMO. Rather, the State of Illinois, in its role as
employer, had asked for bids from various health care provider organizations,
and this particular bid came in higher than the State wanted to pay.3 The rejection
of this bid, moreover, resulted in an essentially all-or-nothing situation. That is,
the affected employees were not told that their employer (i.e., the State) would
pay x dollars toward their existing coverage, or x percentage of the cost, and they
would have to pay the additional cost if they wanted to remain with their current
plan. Instead, this HMO would no longer be an available option, period.
1. Debra Pressey, State Changing HMO Plan, NEWS-GAZETTE, Apr. 27, 2004, at A-1.
2. Id.
3. Kate Clements, Lawmakers Address Switch in Coverage, NEWS-GAZETTE, Apr. 29, 2004, at A-1
(quoting the spokeswoman for the Governor's Bureau of the Budget stating that the decision "was done 100
percent by the book and done so in a way to get the best... pricing for our taxpayers...").
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To be sure, employees could opt for a so-called indemnity plan instead of the
HMO alternative.4 Under that arrangement, the affected employees would
continue to use the same physicians and other health care providers as they had
done so previously. But most employees would face higher out-of-pocket costs,
5
in some cases substantially higher costs, by choosing this option. The only way
to avoid such costs was to switch to a different HMO, thereby changing their
doctors, hospitals, and pharmacies.
What is so scary about this situation is that it is playing out throughout the
country every day, usually with less media attention, but with the same
consequences for everyone involved. Indeed, what is scariest about this situation
is that this scenario of contract review and possible nonrenewal is precisely how
the system is supposed to work! That is, the employer uses the threat of
nonrenewal to force health care providers to compete on the basis of cost and to
seek competitive advantage by pricing their services below their competitors.
Such threats, of course, can be effective only if they are occasionally carried out.
The possibly horrific consequences for the affected employees are simply part of
the process of controlling health care costs.
Why this is the case is the subject of this Article. The next Part explains
where Americans get their health insurance and how unique the United States is
among developed economies in its reliance on employers for this critical societal
function. Then, the Article considers the advantages and disadvantages of an
employment-based health care financing system. The Article then explains the
impact of tax policy on this system and the problems that necessarily spring from
its design. The Article then analyzes the health savings accounts that were
created by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003.6 The final Part examines the planning and policy implications of these
accounts and offers some observations about their likely impact on how
Americans will finance their health care needs in the future.
II. SOURCES OF HEALTH CARE COVERAGE
In most other developed countries, citizens receive health care as a matter of
right,7 financed through some combination of user fees, such as co-payments and
premiums, and universal charges, typically payroll taxes. For certain portions of
the U.S. population, that description holds true as well. For example, Americans
aged sixty-five years and older or who are disabled receive most of their health
4. Pressey, supra note 1, at A-1.
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-76.
7. See, e.g., Charles Fleming, Europeans Face Health Cuts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at A18 (stating
that "the tenet underpinning most European systems is that, no matter the cost, health coverage is a public right
and key to a cohesive society").
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insurance from Medicare, a program of the federal government. Medicare is
financed by a 2.9% tax on all earned income that is received throughout a
person's work life,9 in addition to monthly premiums of $66.60 (in 2004)# 0 paid
by enrollees, and general income tax revenues. Moreover, persons of any age
who satisfy certain poverty criteria receive their health insurance from Medicaid,
a joint undertaking of the federal and state governments. This program is
financed from general tax revenues of the contributing governments.
But as this graph shows, nearly two out of three Americans receive their












If one disregards those Americans who have no health insurance and those
Americans who are covered by Medicare, employment-based insurance accounts
for 88% of all Americans with health insurance. 12 Moreover, a recent Value of
Benefit Survey revealed that 60% of workers rate health insurance as the single
most important employee benefit, 13 easily outdistancing the next most popular
8. See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 57-102 (3d
9. This tax is collected half (i.e., 1.45%) from the employee and half from the employer. I.R.C.
§§ 3101(b)(6), 311 l(b)(6) (2000).
10. Medicare, The Official U.S. Government Site for Medicare Information, at http://medicare.
custhelp.com/cgi-bin/medicare.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?pfaqid =144 (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. Kathleen McGarry, Public Policy and the U.S. Health Insurance Market: Direct and Indirect
Provision of Insurance, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 789, 791 (2002). This percentage varies by ethnic group, from a low
of 44.6% for Hispanics to a high of 69.5% for Caucasians. Id. at 793.
12. Computed by author using data in previous footnote.
13. Rachel Christensen, Value of Benefits Constant in a Changing World: Findings from the 2001
EBRIIMGA Value of Benefits Survey, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. NOTES, Mar. 2002, at 1-2.
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choice, a retirement savings plan.' 4 This survey was conducted before the Enron
implosion and other corporate debacles diminished the allure of stock market
oriented retirement programs. In other words, most Americans look to their jobs
for health insurance and regard this feature of their employment as extremely
important.
A. Variation by Employer Size
Notwithstanding these realities, employment in America increasingly does
not assure an employee of having health insurance. Smaller employers in
particular tend to offer health insurance to their employees less frequently than
do their larger counterparts. 15 The following chart16 depicts the percentage of
workers in firms of specified sizes with no health insurance:
Number of Employees Percentage





Fewer than 10 31.4
An important survey of small employers found that "[flirms that do not offer
health benefits also tend to have larger proportions of females, workers under age
30, and minority employees."' 7 Perhaps even more significant is the finding that
worker compensation at firms without health benefits is "considerably lower"
than compensation at firms that offer such benefits.' 8
Small employers that provide health benefits typically cite the same sound
business reasons that larger employers give for doing so: providing health
benefits aids employee recruitment, increases employee loyalty, decreases
turnover, and increases productivity. 19 Fully 77% of employers in the survey said
that offering health insurance "is the right thing to do.",20 Most smaller employers
that do not provide health benefits believe that the absence of these benefits has
no effect on their business,21 but these same employers report higher turnover of
14. Id. at 2 (selected by 23%).
15. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the
March 2003 Current Population Survey, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. BRIEF No. 264 (Dec. 2003), at 9.
16. Derived from data in Paul Fronstin, Uninsured Up in 2001, Number With Job-Based Health Benefits
Declines, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. NOTES, Nov. 2002, at 1, 3.
17. Paul Fronstin & Ruth Helman, Small Employers and Health Benefits: Findings From the 2002 Small
Employer Health Benefits Survey, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. BRIEF No. 253 (Jan. 2003), at 10-11.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id. at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id.
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workers.22 In any case, as more Americans work for smaller employers, the
likelihood that they will have health insurance diminishes. The ill-fated Health
Security Act23 that was promoted by the Clinton Administration would have
mandated that employers provide health insurance for their employees, but the
disastrous experience of that proposal makes another attempt in that direction
unlikely.24
B. Variation by Employment Sector
Furthermore, the likelihood of having employer-provided health insurance
varies by the general sector of the economy in which an employee works. The
following chart25 depicts the percentage of workers with employment health




Wholesale and retail 52.7
Personal services 43.2
Agricultural, fishing, mining 41.7
The U.S. economy continues to evolve with fewer jobs in manufacturing and
more jobs in personal services. This structural shift necessarily diminishes the
likelihood that an employee will have access to employer-provided health
insurance.
III. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE
As the preceding section has shown, most Americans of pre-retirement age
receive whatever health insurance they have through their employer. Such
employment-based arrangements have several important advantages and
disadvantages, as highlighted in this Part.
22. Id. at 8.
23. H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993).
24. See Michael J. Graetz, Mandating Employer Health Coverage: The Big Mistake, 60 TAX NOTES
1765 (1993). But see Michael Selz, Small Firms' Argument on Health Mandates Questioned, WALL ST. J., Aug.
29, 1994, at B2. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE
TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS 158-59 (1995).
25. Derived from Paul Fronstin, The Impact on Employment-Based Health Benefits of the Shift from a
Manufacturing Economy to a Service Economy, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. NOTES, June 2004, at 1-5.
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A. Advantages of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans
There are three major advantages of obtaining health insurance through one's
employment: guaranteed acceptance, convenience of enrollment, and lower
distribution and administration costs. Income tax advantages will be considered
in the next Part of this Article.26
1. Guaranteed Acceptance
Most employer-based health plans are group insurance policies that cover all
workers without regard to their individual medical profile. Dependent coverage
for family members is frequently available as well, though these dependents may
be subject to medical underwriting or coverage limitations that are determined by
their pre-existing medical conditions.
2. Convenience of Enrollment
The convenience of payroll deduction enables workers to pay this important
expense automatically, without any affirmative effort on their part. The risk that
health insurance might lapse because of nonpayment of premiums, therefore, is
virtually nil-an extremely important consideration for such vital coverage.
Employer-sponsored health insurance, in other words, employs the power of
inertia in support of an employee's best interests.
3. Costs of Distribution and Administration
Economies of scale translate into lower overall costs compared to
individually obtained insurance policies. Lower costs of educating prospective
purchasers and ensuring collection of premiums are just two aspects of this
enhanced distribution mechanism. Although overhead costs for employer-
sponsored health insurance plans vary by size of employer, they are generally
lower than for individually purchased health insurance policies.27
B. Disadvantages of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans
Employment-based health insurance has two major disadvantages: employer
control of plan design, and loss of coverage when employment ceases.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 23, 31 (2001).
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1. Employer Control of Plan Design
As the episode that began this Article demonstrated, employer-sponsored
health insurance puts the employer in control of many critical plan decisions-
from whether to have a plan at all, to the scope of the plan's coverage, the health
care provider networks to use, the level of premiums to be paid by employees,
and the deductibles and co-payments that the plan will have. In other words,
many extremely important features of health insurance are determined by the
employer that pays the bills rather than the employees who receive the services.
It would be extremely unusual for the decisions made by an employer to accord
with the choices that a diverse workforce would make if the individual
employees could make their own selections and trade-offs. Indeed, that was the
most poignant aspect of the vignette that began this Article: many-perhaps
most-of the affected employees would have been willing to pay some additional
amount to maintain the health plan they currently had, but that was not a choice
that was offered. In point of fact, half of all employees with employer-sponsored
health insurance are not offered a choice of health insurance arrangements.2 8
They get what the employer selects.
2. Loss of Coverage When Employment Ceases
A major drawback of employer-sponsored health insurance is the inevitable
linkage of health coverage with employment. Lose the latter, and you lose the
former as well. As a result, the economic setback that is caused when
employment terminates can quickly degenerate into a financial catastrophe when
the worker-and his or her family-lose health insurance. In other developed
countries, the loss of one's employment does not produce this double whammy.
A federal statute does mandate the availability of continuation coverage,29
but this protection has several significant caveats. Continuation coverage is
limited to only eighteen months. 30 A terminated employee may have found
new employment by that point, but there is no guarantee that the new
employment will include employer-sponsored health insurance, or that the
new coverage will be as comprehensive as the insurance that the previous
employer provided.
In any case, the cost of continuation coverage is borne entirely by the
terminated employee,3 ' without the subsidy that employers typically provide.
The resulting cost to the ex-employee can be staggeringly high-as much as
28. Id. at 27.
29. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161 (a), 1162(1) (2003). See generally Paul Fronstin, Health Insurance Portability:
COBRA Expansions and Job Mobility, EMP. BEN. RES. INST. BRIEF No. 194 (Feb. 1998).
30. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1162(2)(A)(i), 1163(2). This eighteen-month limitation does not apply if the
employer files for bankruptcy. Id. §§ 1162(2)(A)(iii), 1163(6).
31. Id. §§ 1162(3)(A), 1164(1).
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ten times the pre-termination cost or more.32 Given the context of a person
who is not employed, paying the increased cost of this insurance can be
prohibitive. Little wonder, then, that only one in five individuals who are
eligible for continuation coverage actually obtains it.
33
Individually purchased health insurance is usually not much of an option
either. Such policies can be more expensive than continuation coverage, and
these policies may even be completely unavailable because of the former
employee's medical conditions. 34 In other words, loss of the guaranteed-
acceptance feature of employer-based health insurance can be a significant
problem. The bottom line is that in an employment-based health insurance
system, the loss of one's job seriously jeopardizes a person's access to health
insurance.
V. TAx POLICY AND HEALTH INSURANCE
The preceding Part analyzed some of the positive and negative features of a
system wherein most employees obtain coverage of health care costs through
their employers. This Part examines an independent factor that substantially
undergirds this system-namely, tax policy. This Part first explains the history
and context of tax policy's role in employer-provided health insurance and then
considers some of the unintended consequences of this role.
A. Tax Exclusion of Health Insurance Benefits
Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "gross income of an
employee does not include employer-provided coverage under an accident or
health plan. 35 Unlike many other sections of the tax code, this exclusion is
remarkably free of limitations, caps, and phase-outs that are based on an
employee's total income or other factors. 36 As a result, an employer can provide
whatever health insurance it chooses without including any of the attendant costs
of that insurance in the employee's income. A similar exclusion applies to the
employee's payroll tax obligation for Social Security and Medicare
contributions.37 Indeed, the exclusion of health benefits from the payroll tax is an
32. See INSURE.COM, KNOW YOUR COBRA RIGHTS, available at http://www.insure.com/health/
cobra.html (last modified Nov. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
33. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED: COBRA COVERAGE FOR LOW-INCOME
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 1 (2001), available at http://www.kff.org/content/2001/10252001/4021.pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, REACHING THE UNINSURED: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
EXPANDING HEALTH INSURANCE ACCESS 2-3 (2000).
35. I.R.C. § 106(a) (West 2000).
36. Cf. id. § 221 (b)(1), (2) (fixed dollar limit and income-based phase-out for deductions of student loan
interest expense).
37. Id. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3121(a)(2).
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even bigger benefit than the exclusion from the income tax for the two out of
three workers who typically owe more in payroll taxes than in income taxes.3 s
These employee-level exclusions are then bolstered by an income tax
deduction at the employer level. That is, employers may deduct the cost of the
health insurance that they provide from their own federal income tax base39 and
from the computation of their own payroll tax obligations. 40 As a result, the tax
code provides an enormous subsidy for employer-sponsored health insurance:
employers deduct the premiums, but employees do not report the benefit of these
premiums as income.
The size of this subsidy is truly gargantuan. The most careful estimate of the
foregone tax revenue in 2004 reveals the following figures:41
Exclusion Billions($)
Federal income tax 114.7
Social Security taxes 52.2
Medicare taxes 14.2
State income taxes 21.4
Total $202.5
Indeed, the revenue cost relating to health insurance provided by employers
is the single largest tax exclusion, deduction, or credit in the federal
government's compilation of such provisions, usually called the "tax expenditure
budget., 42 This single item outranks the revenue cost of employer-provided
pensions, the special treatment of long-term capital gains, or home mortgage
interest.43 Because most of the states that impose an income tax use the federal
tax code's definition of "income," this exclusion for employer-provided health
insurance reduces state tax receipts as well. 44
38. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TAXES 51 (3d ed. 2004).
39. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2000).
40. Id. §§ 3111(a), (b), 3121(a)(2).
41. See John Shells & Randall Haught, The Cost of Tax-Exempt Health Benefits in 2004, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Feb. 25, 2004, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.106v I, at W4-109 (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
42. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2004-
2008 (JCS-8-03, 27 (2003)).
43. Id. at 22-23, 27-28.
44. See 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 20.02, at 20-4 (3d ed.
2002) ("The overwhelming majority of... states with broad-based income taxes employ federal adjusted gross
income as the computational starting point..."); see also 2 ALL STATES TAX GUIDE (RIA) 3112, at 3057
(Dec. 14, 1993) (listing states that use federal income in determining their tax base).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 36
The distribution of the benefits from this highly favorable tax treatment,
moreover, is a function of the individual employee's income. That is, excluding a
$6,000 annual premium for employer-provided health insurance from the income
of an executive in the 35% tax bracket reduces that person's income tax liability
by $2,100, while the same exclusion for an office worker in the 15% tax bracket
saves only $900 in taxes. This simple example does not consider the additional
savings from excluding the premium from the employee's payroll taxes or from
that person's state income taxes, but the point remains the same: a tax-based
exclusion necessarily benefits upper-income recipients more than lower-income
recipients.
The following chart45 displays the relationship of family income to the
federal tax benefit that is obtained by excluding health insurance premiums from
a recipient's taxable income:






500- - - -
$292$102
0
Less than $10.000- $20,000- $30,000- $40.000- $50,000-




In fact, 26.7% of the federal tax benefit pertains to the 14% of the population
with annual family incomes of $100,000 or more.46 As a result, a peculiar federal
policy has resulted-subsidize health insurance generally but provide the greatest
subsidy to the most economically advantaged.
45. Shells & Haught, supra note 41, at W4-109.
46. Id.atW4-110.
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The combination of an employer-level deduction and an employee-level
exclusion makes employer-provided health insurance even more attractive than
compensation in the form of wages and salaries. Such compensation is also
deductible by the employer paying these funds,47 but wages and salaries are
included in the recipient's income for purposes of the federal income tax,48 the
Social Security and Medicare payroll tax,49 and for most state income taxes as
well. Thus, tax policy actually creates a situation wherein many employees will
prefer expanded health benefits in lieu of additional wage compensation, and the
employer is basically indifferent between these two alternatives because both
expenditures are tax-deductible.
This wages-vs.-health-benefits trade-off was the source of employer-
provided health insurance originally. As described in a history of health
insurance benefits, "[w]hen wages were frozen by the National War Labor Board
[during World War II] and a shortage of workers occurred, employers sought
ways to get around the wage controls in order to attract scarce workers, and
offering health insurance was one option.,, 50 An important ruling by the Internal
Revenue Service in 1943 bolstered this strategy by stating that employees were
not required to pay tax on the value of health insurance premiums that their
employers paid on their behalf.5" This ruling was then codified by Congress in
1954 when it enacted the code section quoted at the beginning of this Part 52
Thus, tax policy has not only subsidized employer-sponsored health insurance,
but it has also favored such insurance over direct compensation of employees.
B. Consequences of the Tax Treatment of Health Insurance
The preferential tax treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance that
was described above has produced two important consequences: over-insurance
and over-utilization of health services.
1. Over-Insurance
As long as an employee anticipates having medical expenses, that person is
better off with less wage compensation and more comprehensive health
insurance. For example, assume that Janet has a choice of two employer-
provided health insurance plans: Plan A covers all health costs after Janet pays
for $500 of medical expenses in a given year; Plan B has no annual deductible.
47. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2000).
48. Id. § 61(a)(1).
49. Id. § 3121(a).
50. History of Health Insurance Benefits, FACTS FROM EBRI (Employment Benefit Research Institute,
Washington D.C.), Mar. 2002, at 1.
51. Special Rule, 433 STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. (CCH), 6587.
52. I.R.C. § 106 (West 2000).
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Further assume that Janet's employer will increase her salary by $500 per year if
she chooses Plan A. Finally, assume that the employer's cost for the two health
insurance plans differs by the amount of annual deductible-say $4,500 for Plan
A and $5,000 for Plan B.
Under these facts, the employer's pre-tax costs are the same regardless of
Janet's choice. If Janet chooses Plan A, the employer will increase her salary by
$500 and will pay $4,500 for Janet's health insurance - a total of $5,000. This is
the same cost to the employer as the Plan B insurance policy. Moreover, the
employer can deduct the entire $5,000 in either case.5 3
For Janet, however, there is a major difference in these two alternatives. If
Janet is in the 25% federal income tax bracket and lives in a state with a 5%
income tax, she will owe the following taxes on her additional compensation of
$500:
Federal income tax $125.00
Payroll taxes 54  76.50
State income tax55  25.00
$22-6.50
Thus, Janet will have an after-tax income of only $273.50 and will still be
obligated to pay the first $500 of medical expenses that she incurs, a potential net
loss of $226.50. In contrast, if Janet chooses Plan B, she will owe no taxes on the
additional $500 of value that is represented by the no-deductible health insurance
policy, 56 and she will not be obligated for any of her medical expenses.
Given this situation, Janet has every incentive to choose the most
comprehensive medical insurance policy that is offered, even preferring first-
dollar coverage to a comparable increase in her salary. As a result, Janet will opt
to over-insure in order to use insurance to cover routine and readily predictable
expenses, not just unusual or unanticipated medical costs. In an automotive
context, this situation is comparable to buying insurance for the cost of oil
changes and tire rotations, as well as the cost of serious accidents. This misuse of
insurance artificially inflates the cost of health insurance itself, as deductibles and
co-payments are disfavored and more comprehensive polices are preferred.
53. Id. § 162(a)(1).
54. This amount includes the employer portion of the Social Security and Medicare payroll
taxes,because economists generally treat these costs as being paid ultimately by the employee through lower
wages. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & JON M. BAKUA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
74-75 (1994).
55. For this purpose, the deductibility of state income taxes is ignored because nearly two-thirds of
American taxpayers do not "itemize" their deductions and therefore do not receive any federal tax benefit from
their state income tax payments. See Brian Balkovic, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 2002,
STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2003-04, 6 (63.7% in 2002).
56. I.R.C. § 106(a) (West 2000).
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2. Over- Utilization of Health Care
Having opted for the most comprehensive health insurance policy available,
many employees will feel duty-bound to make sure that they get their money's
worth by seeking health care for every possible malady and mishap. After all,
Janet in the preceding example accepted a lower wage in lieu of more
comprehensive health insurance. She therefore wants this trade-off to work out
for her benefit. In effect, she has no incentive to economize on health care
expenditures. To the contrary, Janet has every incentive to run to the doctor for
every minor scrape-a form of "moral hazard" wherein the presence of insurance
alters the insured's behavior toward incurring the very expenses that are covered
by that insurance. As explained in a 2003 report prepared for the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress, "[i]ndividuals with more comprehensive health
insurance coverage tend to spend more money on health care. Insurance lowers
the net cost of health services at the time a patient decides to purchase care."
57
More recently, the Comptroller General of the United States indicated that
the tax exclusion of health insurance has "desensitized" workers to the cost of
their health care.58 He further contended that the tax exclusion has induced
demand for health services, thereby raising the cost of health care generally. 59 An
open question remains whether employees might undertake more seriously
lifestyle changes that affect their health-for example, stopping smoking,
monitoring food intake, exercising more regularly, and avoiding alcohol abuse-
if they saw the impact of these behaviors on their health insurance costs. Under
present circumstances, the failure to make these changes may increase their
medical expenses, but individual employees do not pay these costs in any way
that they can see.
V. HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
As part of the 2003 Medicare legislation, Congress authorized the creation of
health savings accounts ("HSA")60 in an effort to try a different approach. This
Part examines these accounts, which became effective for the first time in 2004.61
57. TOM MILLER, How THE TAx EXCLUSION SHAPED TODAY'S PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
(Joint Econ. Comm.), Dec. 17, 2003, at 4.
58. Elizabeth White, GAO Head Urges New Look at Exclusion From Tax of Job-Related Health
Coverage, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Apr. 19, 2004 (reporting remarks of David M. Walker).
59. Id. See also Jonas Schreyogg, Demographic Development and Moral Hazard: Health Insurance with
Medical Savings Accounts, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 689, 691 (2004).
60. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
§ 1201(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-76 (adding I.R.C. § 223 (West Supp. 2004)).
61. Id. § 1201(k).
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A. Background and Overview
HSAs did not spring forth out of thin air. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 199662 created very similar accounts, called Medical
Savings Accounts 63 ("MSAs," later renamed "Archer MSAs"64). Both types of
accounts combine a tax-favored savings account that is controlled by the
employee/account-holder 65 and a high-deductible health insurance policy.66 The
operative concept of HSAs and MSAs is the same: the high-deductible insurance
plan covers major health expenditures, and the associated savings account can be
used to pay for care that is not covered by the insurance plan, including the plan's
annual deductible.67 These savings accounts, moreover, are the property of the
account-holder, and any funds remaining in the account at the end of the taxable
year stay in the account for that person's use in future years. 68 The premise
behind these accounts is that the account-holder will see that medical expenses
paid out of that person's account reduce his or her economic resources. As a
consequence, it is expected, holders of these accounts will be more cautious in
purchasing discretionary health care services and will seek out the best price
available. 69 They are, after all, spending their own money, not the funds of some
impersonal insurance company.
Despite these structural similarities, HSAs and MSAs are not equivalent.
Most of the differences are of no concern here, but three major differences should
be noted. First, MSAs were established under a statutory provision that had a
stipulated termination date.70 This termination date was later extended by
subsequent legislation, but only for very short periods of time-an additional
year or two. 71 More importantly, the concept of a specified termination date was
retained. That feature indisputably hampered the acceptance of MSAs, because
employers, employees, and insurance companies were understandably reluctant
to adopt a radically different approach to health care financing when it appeared
62. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2037-48 (adding I.R.C. § 220 (West 2000)).
63. See I.R.C. § 220 (West 2000).
64. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appx. G., § 202, 114 Stat.
2763A-587, 2763A-628 to 2763A-629.
65. I.R.C. §§ 220(d)(1), 223(d)(1) (West 2000).
66. Id. §§ 220(c)(2), 223(c)(2).
67. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Medical Savings Accounts Offer Benefits, Risks, WALL ST. J., May 1, 1996,
at C 1; Greg Scandlen, A Guide to Medical Savings Accounts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A22. See generally
Joni L. Landy, Preserving the Tax Advantages of Medical Savings Accounts, 90 J. TAX'N 161 (1999).
68. I.R.C. §§ 220(d)(l)(E), 223(d)(1)(E) (West 2000); see also Landy, supra note 67, at 161.
69. See Scandlen, supra note 67, at A22.
70. I.R.C. § 220(i)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2000); Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-311, § 322(a), 118 Stat. 1166, 1183 (two-year extension).
71. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appx. G, § 201(a), 114 Stat.
2763A-587, 2763A-628 (two-year extension); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-147, § 612(a), 116 Stat. 21, 61 (one-year extension).
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that the entire enterprise would vanish within a few short years. 72 In contrast,
HSAs are a permanent feature of the tax code, with no automatic termination or
"sunset" provision in place. Congress can always change the tax law, of course,
but barring such a change, HSAs will continue indefinitely.
Second, MSAs were subject to a national limit on the number of qualifying
accounts that could be created.73 This number-750,000-was not tiny, and an
elaborate mechanism was created to keep a running tabulation.7 4 In point of fact,
the national limit was never exceeded or even approached: only about 80,000
MSAs were ever established.75 But the very existence of a national limit,
determined cumulatively, acted to depress interest in these accounts and cramped
efforts to more broadly fashion payment mechanisms and the associated
insurance policies.76 In contrast, HSAs are not subject to any overall limit on the
number of qualifying accounts that can be created.
Finally, MSAs could be created only for self-employed individuals 77 and
persons who worked for employers with no more than fifty employees.
78
Ameliorative rules softened the full impact of the fifty-employees rule,79 but the
need to monitor this limitation and its exceptions further restricted the number of
persons who might be interested in establishing an MSA. The HSA rules have no
comparable restrictions on eligibility.
B. The "High Deductible" Insurance Plan
An essential component of the HSA arrangement is that the account-holder
must be covered by a "high deductible health plan"s and by only such a plan.8'
The precise parameters of such plans are not delineated, but certain key
parameters are stipulated. They involve the plan's annual deductible, its limit on
out-of-pocket expenses, and the scope of covered services.
72. See also George Anders, Medical Savings Accounts Are Proving a Tough Sell, WALL ST. J., May 22,
1997, at A16 (noting that the sales commissions on high-deductible insurance policies associated with MSAs
are lower than commissions on conventional health insurance policies because those policies are typically more
expensive; as a result, insurance agents are less inclined to promote MSAs).
73. I.R.C. § 220(j)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2004).
74. See id. § 220(0); I.R.S. Notice 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 219, 221-22 (Q&A 24 - QA 29).
75. Announcement 2002-90, 2002-2 C.B. 684 (78,913 MSAs).
76. See Gwen Moulton, State Laws, Cap on Policies May Thwart Participation in MSA Demonstration
Project, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Sept. 13, 1996, at J-1.
77. I.R.C. §§ 220(c)(1)(A)(iii)(l1), 401(c)(1)(B) (West 2000).
78. Id. § 220(c)(1)(A)(iii)(I), (4)(A).
79. Id. § 220(c)(4)(B), (C)(i), (C)(iii).
80. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A)(i) (enacted by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201(a), 117 Stat. 2066, 2469-76) [hereinafter MPDIMA].
81. Id. § 223(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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1. Minimum Annual Deductible
A qualifying "high deductible health plan" must have an annual deductible of
at least $1,000 for a single person (so-called "self-only coverage") 82 or $2,000
for a family.83 A plan's deductible may be much higher than these minimums,
subject to the out-of-pocket limits that will be discussed below. But the point is
that the insurance plan that is associated with a HSA must have a deductible that
is no less than $1,000 for self-only coverage or $2,000 for family coverage.
,,84This deductible need not apply, however, to "preventive care. Such care
can be covered with a lower deductible, or even none at all. In April 2004, the
Internal Revenue Service released a nonexclusive list 85 of what constitutes
''preventive care," including the following:
* periodic health evaluations, including diagnostic procedures
* routine prenatal and well-child care
* immunizations
* tobacco cessation programs
* obesity weight-loss programs
A much longer list 86 of screening services were included as well, covering tests
for such maladies, among others, as:
* cancer of the breast, cervix, prostate, colon, skin, and ovaries
* heart and vascular diseases
* sexually transmitted diseases
* substance abuse and suicide
* periodontal disease
* metabolic conditions, including diabetes
* glaucoma and hearing impairment
Thus, many typical medical procedures need not be subject to the health
insurance plan's relatively high annual deductible.
82. Id. § 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I). This amount will be indexed for inflation after 2004. See id. §§ 1(f)(3),
223(g)(1)(B)(ii).
83. See id. 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(II). This amount will be indexed for inflation after 2004. See id. §§ 1(f)(3),
223(g)(1)(B)(ii).
84. Id. § 223(c)(2)(C).
85. I.R.S. Notice 2004-23, 2004-15 I.R.B. 725.
86. Id. 726-27.
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2. Maximum Limit on Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
A qualifying health insurance plan must also limit the out-of-pocket expenses
of the insured to no more than $5,000 for self-only coverage, 87 or $10,000 for
family coverage. 88 A plan can offer varying levels of co-payments or other cost-
sharing arrangements, but this limit on out-of-pocket expenses, other than
premiums for the insurance plan itself,89 must apply. Lower limits are allowable,
subject to the minimum annual deductibles that were considered above. But the
point is that the insurance plan that is associated with a HSA must limit an
insured's out-of-pocket expenses to a maximum of $5,000 for self-only coverage
or $10,000 for family coverage.
For example, assume that Kevin has a policy with a 20% co-payment feature,
and his medical expenses this year were $3,000. If the policy has a $1,000 annual
deductible, Kevin pays the first $1,000 and 20% of the remaining $2,000 ($3,000
of expenses less the $1,000 annual deductible), or $400. His total out-of-pocket
expenses, therefore, are $1,400 ($1,000 annual deductible plus $400 co-payment
obligation). If the policy had an out-of-pocket expense limit of, say $4,000, he
would reach this limit once his medical costs exceeded $16,000.90 All of Kevin's
medical expenses above this amount would be covered by the insurance plan.
There are, however, two important exceptions. First, higher out-of-pocket
expense limits are allowable for medical services that are received from outside
the health insurance plan's network of providers. 91 Second, a policy may impose
a "reasonable lifetime limit" on benefits,92 and the Service has indicated that a
$1,000,000 cap meets this standard.93
87. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (West 2004) (enacted by MPDIMA, supra note 80, § 1201(a)). This
amount will be indexed for inflation after 2004. See Id. §§ I(f)(3), 223(g)(1)(B)(ii).
88. Id. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (West 2004) (enacted by MPDIMA, supra note 80, § 1201(a)). This amount
will be indexed for inflation after 2004. See Id. §§ I(f)(3), 223(g)(1)(B)(iii).
89. Id. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (parenthetical clause).
90. This amount is computed as follows:
Policy's out-of-pocket limit $4,000
Annual deductible (1.000)
Co-payment of obligation $3,000
Divided by co-payment .20
Costs subject to co-payment $15,000
Annual deductible $1,000
Medical costs to reach cap Rhmo
91. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(D)(i) (West 2004). Similarly, expenses that exceed "usual, customary, and
reasonable amounts" need not be considered in applying a policy's limit on out-of-pocket expenses. I.R.S.
Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, 199-200 (Q&A 16).
92. I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, 199 (Q&A 14).
93. Id.
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3. Other Permitted Health Insurance
A person with a HSA must have a qualifying "high deductible health plan"
and no other form of health insurance. 94 Neither tax law nor health law seem
capable of articulating a requirement without providing exceptions, so some
specific types of health insurance are allowed notwithstanding this putative
limitation. That is, certain types of health insurance do not jeopardize an
insured's ability to have a HSA-namely, disability, dental, vision, or long-term
care insurance;95 plans that cover specified diseases96 (e.g., cancer insurance);
and plans that pay a fixed amount for each hospital day. 9 7 Also allowed are health
benefits from plans that primarily insure property, 98 with automobile accident
insurance being the most typical example.
C. Operation of the HSA Itself
The tax code imposes significant limitations on the HSAs themselves in three
areas: how much can be contributed to the accounts, what expenses may be paid
out of the accounts, and what happens to unused balances in the accounts.
1. Contributions to a HSA
Contributions to a HSA by a person's employer are excludible from that
person's income for purposes of computing income 99 and employment taxes.100 A
person may also contribute his or her own funds to a HSA,10l in which case those
contributions are deductible in deriving that person's "adjusted gross income.',
10 2
This tax treatment is far more favorable than that accorded medical expenses
generally. 0 3 Those expenses, after all, are deducted only by the minority of
taxpayers' °4 who claim so-called "itemized deductions"' 1 5 and even then, only to
94. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A) (West 2004). For this purpose, an employer-sponsored "wellness program" is
not a form of health insurance. I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, 199 (Q&A 10, Ex. (3)).
95. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2004).
96. Id. § 223(c)(1)(B)(i), (3)(B).
97. Id. § 223(c)(1)(B)(i), (3)(C).
98. Id. § 223(c)(1)(B)(i), (3)(A)(iii).
99. Id. § 106(d)(1) (enacted by MPDIMA, supra note 80, § 1201(d)(1)).
100. Id. §§ 3231(e)(11), 3306(b)(18), 3401(a)(22) (enacted by MPDIMA, supra note 80, §
1201(d)(2)(A)-(C)).
101. Id. § 223(a).
102. Id. § 62(a)(19) (enacted by MPDIMA, supra note 80, § 1201(b)). The phrase "adjusted gross
income" refers to a person's total income minus the deductions that are listed in section 62(a). See generally
BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 12.01[3] (3d ed. 2002).
103. I.R.C. § 213(a) (West 2004).
104. Supra note 55.
105. I.R.C. §§ 63(d)(1), 62(a)(l)-(19), 213(a) (West 2004); see also BITTKER ET AL., supra note 102,
26.1.
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the extent that those expenses exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's "adjusted gross
income."' 0 6 This tax treatment of HSA contributions, in other words, is more akin
to that of employer-provided health insurance, premiums for which are excluded
from an employee's income without regard to the amount of deductions that are
being claimed or the level of the taxpayer's income.
10 7
HSA contributions are subject, however, to an overall limitation, whether
they come from the employer or from the employee. 10 8 This limitation is the
lesser' 9 of: (1) the annual deductible of the "high deductible health plan" that is
associated with the HSA, 110 or (2) a limit that is adjusted annually for inflation."'
In 2004, that limit is $2,600 for self-only coverage and $5,150 for family
coverage." 2 So, if Eric obtains a "high deductible health plan" with an annual
deductible of $2,500, he can contribute this amount to his HSA because it is less
than this year's contribution limit of $2,600. On the other hand, if Charlene
purchases a family insurance plan with an annual deductible of $6,000, the most
that she can contribute to her HSA is $5,150 because this year's family limit (i.e.,
$5,150) is less than her insurance policy's $6,000 annual deductible.
As is apparently always the case, there is an exception to the rule: persons
who are aged fifty-five years or older by the end of the year may make additional
contributions. 1 3 The amount of this so-called "catch-up" contribution starts at
$500 for 2004 and increases by $100 per year thereafter, until it reaches $1,000
in 2009.114 On the other hand, any person who is entitled to Medicare benefits-
which generally means someone who is sixty-five years of age or older' 15-may
not make any contribution to a HSA, 116 either regular or "catch-up."
2. Distributions from a HSA
Funds held by a HSA may be invested until they are needed to pay the
account-holder's medical expenses. Any interest income, dividends, and capital
gains thus realized by the HSA are free of income tax while they remain in the
HSA.1. Moreover, funds that are withdrawn to pay "qualified medical expenses"
106. I.R.C. § 213(a) (West 2004).
107. Id. § 106(a).
108. Id. § 223(b)(4)(B).
109. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A), (B).
110. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A)(i), (B)(i).
111. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B3)(ii), (g)(I)(B)(i).
112. I.R.S. Notice 2004-2,2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 270 (Q&A 12).
113. I.R.C. § 223(b)(3)(A) (West 2004).
114. Id. § 223(b)(3)(B).
115. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 58-61.
116. I.R.C. § 223(b)(7) (West 2004). But see I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, 198 (Q&A 2)
(a person who is eligible for Medicare benefits but who has not enrolled in that program is not "entitled" to such
benefits and may therefore contribute to a HSA).
117. I.R.C. § 223(e)(1) (West 2004).
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are not taxed when they are withdrawn." 8 Only withdrawals that are used for
purposes other than to pay medical costs are subject to income tax.'' 9 Such
nonmedical distributions, however, are also subject to an additional tax of
10%,120 unless those distributions occur upon the death or disability of the
account-holder,121 or when that person attains sixty-five years of age.1
22
The pivotal issue, therefore, is what constitutes "qualified medical expenses."
Generally, any expenditure that would be deductible as a "medical expense"
under Internal Revenue Code Section 213(d) qualifies for this purpose. 123 This
definition is quite extensive and even includes transportation that is undertaken
primarily for medical care' 24 and lodging "while away from home" to obtain such
care. 125 Prescription drugs 2 6 and nonprescription drugs127  alike qualify.
Moreover, any medical costs that are not paid by the "high deductible health
plan" because of that plan's annual deductible or co-payment provisions can be




Such distributions may not, however, be used to buy supplemental health
insurance beyond the "high deductible health plan."'' 29 Certain types of insurance
are excepted from this prohibition, including long-term care insurance 30 and
enrollee premiums for Medicare coverage.'13 So-called "medigap" insurance' 32 is
not included in this exception, 133 so HSA funds may not be used to pay for such
policies.
3. Unused HSA Balances
As noted above, distributions from a HSA are tax-free to the extent of
"qualified medical expenses.' 34 But what if the HSA has a balance remaining in
the account after all qualifying medical costs have been paid? This balance
118. Id. § 223(0(1).
119. Id. § 223(0(2).
120. Id. § 223(f)(4)(A).
121. Id. §§ 223(f)(4)(B), 72(m)(7).
122. Id. § 223(f)(4)(C).
123. Id. § 223(d)(2)(A).
124. Id. § 213(d)(1)(B).
125. Id. § 213(d)(2).
126. Id. § 213(d)(3).
127. See Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-38 I.R.B. 559; I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 272 (Q&A
26).
128. See Sarah Lueck, Medicare Law Reaches The Under-65 Set, Too, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2003, at
DI.
129. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2)(B) (West 2004).
130. Id. § 223(d)(2)(C)(ii); see generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 134-49.
131. I.R.C. § 223(d)(2)(C)(iv); (West 2004) I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 272 (Q&A 27).
132. See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 90-96.
133. Supra note 129.
134. I.R.C. § 223(f)(1) (West 2004).
2005/ Who's Afraid of Personal Responsibility?
simply carries forward and remains available for the account-holder's use in a
subsequent year. 135 This feature applies, moreover, even if the account-holder is
eligible for Medicare' 36 in that subsequent year and is therefore not eligible to
make new contributions to his or her HSA. 13 7 And distributions remain tax-free
as long as they are used to pay for "qualified medical expenses."
Should an account-holder die with a balance remaining in the HSA, the tax
consequences depend upon who inherits the HSA balance. If the new owner is
the surviving spouse of the account-holder, the HSA becomes the HSA of that
person, 38 and all of the other HSA provisions apply without change. But if
anyone other than the account-holder's surviving spouse succeeds to the HSA,
that account loses its status as a HSA, 139 and the balance in the account is
included in that person's taxable income. 140 In other words, a HSA is intended to
cover medical expenses of the person who establishes the account, and possibly
that person's spouse, but otherwise it gets no special tax treatment.
VI. PLANNING AND POLICY ANALYSIS OF HSAs
This Part examines some of the planning considerations that HSAs present
for employees and employers, as well as related issues of public policy. This
analysis proceeds through five C's: Complexity-Confusion, Control-Choice, and
finally, the Cost of health care.
A. Complexity and Confusion
The basic concept of HSAs is fairly straightforward: pair a high-deductible
health insurance policy with a dedicated discretionary account. But as the
preceding part of this article suggested, the actual implementation of this concept
can be quite involved.141 There are three major sources of HSA complexity and
resulting employee confusion: the range of packages available, compliance and
administration of the accounts themselves, and difficulties in considering
alternative arrangements.
135. See Lueck, supra note 128, at DI.
136. I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 L.R.B. 269, 272 (Q&A 28).
137. I.R.C. § 223(b)(7) (West 2004).
138. Id. § 223(f)(8)(A). This treatment applies only if the surviving spouse receives the HSA as that
account's "designated beneficiary." Id.
139. Id. § 223(f)(8)(B)(i)(I).
140. Id. § 223(f)(8)(B)(i)(ll). If the new owner is not the account-holder's estate, the amount taxed is
reduced by "qualified medical expenses" incurred by the account-holder that were paid within one year after
that person died. Id. § 223(f)(8)(B)(ii)(I).
141. See Todd F. Maynes & Thomas L. Evans, A Guide to Health Savings Accounts and a Plea for
Practicality, 102 TAx NOTEs 775 (2004).
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1. Possible Configurations
The key parameters of HSAs provide bounded but still fairly wide flexibility
in shaping the exact dimensions of these arrangements, with the result that very
different packages can emerge. Analysis of HSAs, therefore, necessarily depends
to a great extent on the precise contours of the HSAs that are established. For
example, the health insurance policies associated with HSAs must have a
deductible of at least $1,000 for self-only coverage 42 and a limit on out-of-
pocket expenses of no more than $5,000.143 Thus, the deductible on these policies
could be as low as $1,000 or as high as $5,000-an enormous range. The annual
contribution to the HSA, moreover, is a maximum of either the policy's actual
deductible 144 or $2,600 (in 2004), 14 5 whichever is lower. 146 The actual
contribution might be less than this limit, in some cases substantially less.
Indeed, an employer is not required to contribute to an employee's HSA at all.
Employees may make their own contributions, of course, to these accounts,
either as supplements to their employer's contributions or as substitutes for those
contributions, subject to the overall limits that were set forth above.' 47 The ability
and willingness of employees to make such contributions, however, will vary
considerably, depending upon an individual employee's anticipated health costs
and financial situation, including that person's marginal tax rate. That is,
employee contributions to an HSA are deductible from that person's taxable
income, 48 but this provision provides only minimal incentive to fund a HSA for
the three-quarters of American workers whose marginal tax rate is 15% or less.
149
The simple reality is that a $2,000 contribution to a HSA lowers a person's tax
liability by only $200 to an employee in the 10% tax bracket. In contrast, that
same contribution lowers an executive's tax liability by $700 if that person is in
the 35% tax bracket. Accordingly, the ability of employees to fund their own
HSAs will have very different effects across the economic spectrum of affected
individuals.
142. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2004).
143. Id. § 223(c)(A)(ii)(I).
144. Id. § 223(b)(2)(A)(i).
145. I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 270 (Q&A 12).
146. I.R.C. § 223(b)(2)(A) (West 2004).
147. Id. § 223(b)(4)(B).
148. Id. § 223(a).
149. See EDWIN PARK ET AL., HEALTH SAVINGS SECURITY ACCOUNTS: A COSTLY TAX CUT THAT
COULD WEAKEN EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 4 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org (last
visited July 9, 2003).
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Be that as it may, a few examples of possible combinations of insurance plan
deductibles and HSA contributions will illustrate the range of alternative
packages that are available under the HSA regime:





In scenario A and B, the HSA contribution fully matches the deductible of
the associated insurance policy, and the employee should have little financial
exposure. Of course, if the HSA contributions actually came from the employee,
in whole or in part, those contributions already represent a financial cost borne by
the employee. But if those HSA contributions came entirely from the employer,
the employee might actually have less financial exposure to health care costs than
under a more conventional health insurance policy with a "low" annual
deductible of, say $250, for example.
In contrast, scenarios C and D posit significant financial exposure to the
employee, even if the HSA contributions came entirely from the employer. The
health insurance policies in these scenarios are a bit extreme, to be sure, but they
fall within the stipulated HSA parameters. 50 These policies would pay for no
costs until an employee's costs reached $5,000 on an annual basis; thereafter,
they would cover all costs because the $5,000 limit on out-of-pocket expenses
would already be in effect. In scenario C, the HSA has been funded to the legal
maximum, but it still falls far short of closing the gap that is created by the
insurance policy's high deductible. And in scenario D, that gap is even larger.
More possible combinations could be fashioned, but the point would remain the
same: there is no stipulated relationship between the associated insurance
policy's deductible and the HSA's actual contribution. Therefore, an employee's
financial exposure with a HSA is dependent upon the parameters of the specific
package that he or she confronts-a fact that complicates analysis of HSAs
considerably. Just a quick comparison of scenarios A and D precludes any easy
generalizations about the benefits and burdens of HSAs.
150. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(i)(I), (ii)(I) (West 2004).
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2. Compliance and Administration
Once a HSA is established, withdrawals may be made free of any tax to pay
for "qualified medical expenses,"151 as noted previously. Funds that are used for
any other purpose are included in the account-holder's taxable income,
52
however, and further subjected to an additional tax of 10% in most cases. 153 As a
result, the tax consequences of withdrawing funds from a HSA can range from
zero to 45%,154 or even higher in some cases. 5 5 With such a dramatic difference
at stake, it is important that someone monitor how HSA withdrawals are in fact
used.
HSAs are established as trusts, 156 and the trustee can be a bank, an insurance
company, or some other institution that will administer the account
appropriately. 57 The Internal Revenue Service has indicated, however, that the
responsibility for assuring that HSA distributions are used exclusively to pay
medical costs lies not with the HSA's trustee or custodian, 58 or even with the
employer. 159 That decision leaves only one person left to do this important task-
the account-holder of the HSA.
Of course, taxpayers have the burden of complying with tax provisions
generally. But this burden may be particularly difficult with regard to HSAs for
three reasons. First, the HSA account-holder must ensure that only "qualifying
medical expenses" are paid with HSA funds. The definition of such costs, as
noted previously,' 60 is quite broad, but there are exceptions. Cosmetic surgery,
for example, does not qualify161 in most circumstances. 162 Lodging to obtain
medical treatment qualifies, but only up to $50 per night.' 63 Premiums for long-
151. Id. § 223(f)(1).
152. Id. § 223(f(2).
153. Id. § 223(f)(4)(A). Exceptions are in id. § 223(f)(4)(B), (C).
154. The highest statutory tax rate of 35% plus the "additional" tax of 10% equals 45%. See id. § 1(i)(2)
(amended by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 105(a), 117 Stat.
752,755).
155. Any additional income above $142,700 (in 2004) reduces the taxpayer's itemized deductions,
thereby raising the effective tax rate on that additional income. See I.R.C. § 68(a), (b)(2) (West 2004); Rev.
Proc. 2003-85, sec. 3.11; 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184, 1188. See generally BrIrKER ET AL., supra note 102, 121.03, at
21-27 to 21-28.
156. I.R.C. § 223(d)(1) (West 2004).
157. Id. § 223(d)(l)(B).
158. I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269, 272 (Q&A 29).
159. Id. (Q&A 30).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
161. I.R.C. §§ 213(d)(9)(A), 223(d)(2)(A) (West 2004). For this purpose, "cosmetic surgery" is "any
procedure which is directed at improving the patient's appearance and does not meaningfully promote the
proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease." Id. § 213(d)(9)(B).
162. Such surgery does qualify if it "is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly
related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring
disease." Id. § 213(d)(9)(A).
163. Id. § 213(d)(2) (last sentence).
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term care insurance also qualify,' 64 but only up to certain age-based limits165 that
are adjusted annually for inflation. 166 It is a bit much to ask ordinary people to
monitor these distinctions. And yet, if the Internal Revenue Service decides to
question the tax-free status of a HSA withdrawal, it is the HSA account-holder
who must document the appropriateness of the expenditures that the withdrawal
at issue was used to pay. t67
Second, the account-holder must also keep track of the cumulative total of
medical expenses that have been paid in order to know when the associated
health insurance policy takes over.168 For example, a deductible of $2,000 means
that the HSA owner pays the first $2,000 of medical expenses and then must
document such payment before the insurance company will pay a claim for
benefits under its policy. Low-deductible insurance plans have this same
requirement, of course, but a high-deductible plan necessarily increases this
administrative burden because many more small expenditures are typically
involved in reaching a high-deductible plan's threshold for payment.
Finally, certain medical costs may be eligible for payment with HSA funds
but do not count toward satisfying the insurance policy's deductible. 169 While the
definition of "qualified medical expenses" for HSA purposes is very broad, the
scope of expenses that may be counted against the insurance policy's annual
deductible is determined by the insurance policy itself. Some insurance policies
may simply adopt the HSA definition, but they are not required to do so.
Assume, for example, that Patty has a high-deductible insurance policy that
pays for all doctors' bills and hospital costs after the first $1,000 of such
expenses, but does not cover dental or vision expenses. Assume further that Patty
uses $850 from her HSA to pay for a crown on one of her molars and for
prescription sunglasses-both of which are "qualified medical expenses" for
purposes of HSA withdrawals. Nevertheless, Patty's insurance policy does not
consider these expenditures as covered medical costs, so if Patty subsequently
goes into a hospital, she will still be responsible for the first $1,000 of hospital
charges incurred-not the $150 that she might surmise. 170 Clearly, the distinction
between allowable HSA expenses and covered expenses in the associated
insurance policy is critical, if subtle, and can easily create a trap for the unwary.
164. Id. § 213(d)(1)(D).
165. Id. § 213(d)(1) (last sentence), (10)(A); I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196, 203-04 (Q&A
41).
166. I.R.C. § 213(d)(10)(B) (West 2004). See Rev. Proc. 2003-85, sec. 3.18, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1184, 1189
(limits applicable in 2004).
167. Letter from Leslie Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Treasury Department, to
Congressman Bill Archer, quoted in Martin A. Sullivan, The Side Effects of Health Savings Accounts, 100 TAX
NoTEs 301, 311 (2003).
168. See Sullivan, supra note 167, at 310.
169. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, New Medical Plans for Small Businesses Carry Investment Options but
Also Risks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1997, at Cl (discussing this issue in the context of the predecessor to HSAs).
170. The policy deductible of $1,000 less the $850 expended equals $150.
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3. Alternative Arrangements
Understanding HSAs would be difficult enough if their enabling legislation
had been written on a clean slate. But it was not. Health reimbursement
accounts 17' and flexible spending accounts 172 predated the creation of HSAs and
continue to exist. Thus, workers and their employers must try to fathom how
these new accounts fit within the existing framework and how to coordinate the
benefits of these alternatives. 173 That is, there is a complexity cost and a
corresponding increase in consumer confusion whenever a new option is added
to an existing array of choices. 174
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the various alternatives to
HSAs, but consumers and those who advise them will most certainly need to do
so. To that end, elaborate columnar presentations set forth the different features
and limitations of the options that are now available.175 But the real difficulty
comes in applying these various regimes to a specific person's situation. Survey
research has shown that many consumers do not understand their present health
care plans very well. 176 And people have even greater difficulty trying to forecast
their future medical needs. 77 A major study entitled "Decision Making in
Consumer-Directed Health Plans" concluded as follows:
The difficulty of the decision tasks required of consumers and the skills
needed to successfully manage within these plans may be beyond the
level of effort consumers are willing to expend or may even be beyond
the ability of many consumers to understand .... These plans pose
particular challenges for individuals with less than adequate literacy and
decision skills.
178
171. Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; see also I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93. See generally
Stanley D. Baum, Health Reimbursement Arrangements-Who Will Benefit from the Service's Newest
Healthcare Plan?, 97 J. TAX'N 162 (2002).
172. Such accounts are authorized as part of so-called "cafeteria plans" under I.R.C. section 125. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2 Q&A-7 (1989). See generally Franklin Lowenthal & Philip Storrer, Medical FSAs:
An Expected Value Analysis, 100 TAx NOTES 521 (2003).
173. See Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971 (addressing the interaction between HSAs, flexible
spending accounts, and health reimbursement arrangements).
174. See Victoria Craig Bunce, MSAs Are Not FSAs Are Not HRAs, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Jan. 2003, at
12 ("Many consumers and employers are confused about the differences among plans and which approach is
best."). Cf Richard L. Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, J. RETIREMENT PLAN., Sept.-Oct.
2001, at 15 (analyzing the various options for financing a college education and how those options interact).
175. See, e.g., Stanley D. Baum, The Advantages of Health Savings Accounts-the Code's Newest
Healthcare Arrangement, 100 J. TAx'N 101, 108-09 (2004); Bunce, supra note 174.
176. See Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, HEALTH
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 159.
177. See Johanna Bennett, Custom Health Plans Let Members Design Benefit Mix, Control Costs, WALL
ST. J., July 9, 2002, at D4.
178. JUDITH H. HIBBARD ET AL., DECISION MAKING IN CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS 23
(2003), available at http://www.aarp.org/ppi (last visited June 10, 2003). See also George Loewenstein, Is More
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To take one example that predates HSAs, flexible spending accounts enable
employees to set aside up to $5,000 of pre-tax earnings to pay for medical costs
that are not covered by their existing health insurance. 79 But due to employee
inertia, and a feature of these plans that forfeits any unused balance at the end of
the year, 80 only 12% of employees who have access to these plans choose to
enroll in them. '8 To be sure, HSAs do not have this use-it-or-lose-it feature,1
82
but the experience with flexible spending accounts is symptomatic of the
psychological and educational barriers that similar health care arrangements pose
for many people.
B. Choice and Control
Against this backdrop, one must consider a recent poll of business
economists that found two-thirds of the respondents believe that consumer-driven
plans like HSAs are "the future of health insurance."' 83 Why? Primarily because
the American workforce has become infatuated with individual control over a
range of benefits, from pensions to health care. As this Comment has explained
elsewhere, the overwhelming movement in employer-sponsored retirement plans
has been to shift the responsibility for investing and managing retirement money
to individual employees. 84 Whether through the substitution of so-called
"defined contribution" plans 85 for traditional "defined benefit" plans, 86 or the
increasing predominance of so-called 401(k) plans' 87 and individual retirement
accounts (IRA), 88 this trend is apparently unstoppable. To some extent, the focus
on individual control also manifests itself in the growing fascination with
Choice Always Better? NAT'L ACAD. SOC. INS. SOCIAL SECURITY BRIEF NO. 7 (Oct. 1999), at 6 ("When people
are forced to make decisions for which they lack the requisite expertise, the consequences are likely to be lost
time, bad choices, anxiety and self-recrimination."); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership
Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
179. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2 Q&A-7(f) Ex. 2 (1989).
180. Id. (b)(7); see also Baum, supra note 175, at 109.
181. Daniel Kadlec, Inflexible-Spending Accounts, TIME, Oct. 21, 2002, at 86.
182. A proposal has been made to allow unused balances of up to $500 in flexible spending accounts to
be carried forward to the next year. H.R. 4279, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). There is no limit to how much can
be carried forward in a HSA.
183. See John C. Goodman, Responding to Critics of HSAs, HEALTH CARE NEWS, Feb. 2004, at 15. See
also Linda Stem, Pumped-Up Savings Or Just a Raw Deal?, AARP BULL., July-Aug. 2004, at 22 (reporting
that "three out of four large employers are likely to offer" HSAs to their employees); Louise Story, Health-
Savings Accounts gain Momentum, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2004, at D2 (reporting that "HSAs are expected to
become a standard product of many health insurers and large financial-services firms").
184. Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security Privatization, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 53,
54-63 (2004).
185. See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 356-58.
186. See generally id. at 353-56.
187. See generally Kaplan, supra note 184, at 63-67.
188. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual
Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283 (1999).
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"privatizing" Social Security. 189 In each of these instances, the motivating force
is the same: let me make the choices!
As it is with pensions, so it is becoming with health care. People like control,
and that is what HSAs give them. As one employee said when presented with
various health plan options, "I don't want the company making decisions for me
.... I want the options. I want to do the math. I want to make the decisions.
' 190
Indeed, a particularly intriguing aspect of HSAs is that an employee may
establish a HSA and purchase the required high-deductible insurance policy
without any involvement by that person's employer. Self-created mechanisms
like HSAs, akin to IRAs in the retirement savings context, are a relatively recent
innovation for health care, but they fit perfectly with the sentiment that "[p]eople
are tired of being 'steered' by faceless bureaucrats with suspect motives. They
will do their own steering, thank you."' 9'
In the health care field especially, the focus on individual control is
especially appealing to many people, in part as a reaction to control of medical
decisions by managed care companies.192 With a HSA, the account-holder makes
the decision whether to undergo an additional medical procedure. The HSA
account-holder-and not some "faceless bureaucrat"-negotiates the price with
the health care provider and makes his or her own cost-benefit analysis of
whether a given medical service is worth the expense involved. This sense of
empowerment in an area as vital and personal as health care is heady stuff
indeed. It may even be irresistible.
Given these realities, appeals for a broader sense of community sound
positively dated. For example, a recent lecture by Humphrey Taylor, chairman of
The Harris Poll, addressed this very issue as follows:
Perhaps my biggest concern about consumer choice of health plans is
that it undermines the social contract and social solidarity on which, I
believe, health insurance must be based .... My anxiety is increased by
our polls suggesting that this social contract or social solidarity is under
attack .... In this country, this social solidarity is beginning to
unravel. 1
93
189. See Kaplan, supra note 184, at 81-82 & sources cited in nn.181-85.
190. Bennett, supra note 177.
191. Greg Scandlen, Commonwealth Fund Distorts Employer Attitudes, HEALTH CARE NEWS, May
2004, at 13.
192. See Sullivan, supra note 167, at 302; Ron Winslow & Carol Gentry, Health-Benefits Trend: Give
Workers Money, Let Them Buy a Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2000, at Al.
193. Humphrey Taylor, The Big Health Care Debates that Lie Ahead, HEALTH CARE NEWS, March 11,
2004, at 10-11.
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Well, Mr. Taylor, wake up and smell the latte! The individualism that has
always been more predominant in American culture than in other western
democracies sees HSAs as a way to use health care dollars earned through
employment for one's own benefit--either now or in later years, as unused
balances remain invested and grow tax-free until they are used.
A critical counterpoint is whether consumers in charge of their own health
care accounts will shortchange their care to save money.194 After all, the flipside
of traditional health insurance's tendency to encourage overuse of health care
services is the possibility of arrangements like HSAs to encourage underuse.
Money in a HSA that is not spent on medical services remains the property of the
account-holder. 195 Some folks might even be tempted to use HSAs as
supplemental retirement savings accounts, letting balances accumulate until after
they reach age sixty-five. At that time, HSA funds may be withdrawn for any
purpose-medical or otherwise-without incurring the 10% additional tax that is
usually imposed on HSA withdrawals that pay for nonmedical expenditures.
96
Those withdrawals will still be subject to income tax, 19 7 but the former HSA
account-holder may be in a lower tax bracket by then. 198 In effect, the HSA
account-holder will have gained a tax bracket benefit in addition to having the
funds compound tax-free in the HSA over several years or even several decades.
The possibility of such maneuvers cannot be casually dismissed. Some
people who currently have health insurance policies that adjust premiums for past
usage already curtail doctor visits to avoid higher insurance costs in the future.' 99
This pattern would be even more likely to occur in arrangements like HSAs
where the consumer can see immediately the financial gain from such actions.
For some people, such decisions would be quite unfortunate. The short-term
savings could well lead to larger health care expenses down the road as their
medical conditions get out of control. One study found that increasing the portion
of prescription drugs' costs that were paid by employees reduced consumption of
those drugs, but visits to hospital emergency rooms went up correspondingly.20°
One company, in fact, tried the opposite approach: it reduced the co-payment
portion for certain prescription drugs, resulting in increased consumption of those
194. See Jim Jaffe, Consumer-Driven Health Benefits: A Continuing Evolution?, EMP. BEN. RES. INST.
NOTES, Sept. 2002, at 3.
195. I.R.C. § 223(d)(l)(E) (West 2004).
196. Id. § 223(f)(4)(A), (C).
197. Id. § 223(f)(2).
198. See generally id. § I (a)-(d) (tax brackets).
199. See Chad Terhume, Is All Fair in Health and Insurance?, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2002, at D3.
200. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Higher Co-Pays May Take Toll on Health, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2004, at
DI. Similar results were reported in Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated With Prescription Drug
Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421 (2001). But see Mitchell D. Wong et al.,
Effects of Cost Sharing on Care Seeking and Health Status: Results From the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1889 (2001) (four-year longitudinal study found that cost-sharing reduced the use of care
without any observable differences in self-reported health status).
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drugs but fewer emergency room visits and hospital admissions. z1 Consequently,
overall health care costs actually declined on a net basis.202
Would HSA owners really endanger their own health simply to accumulate
more funds in their accounts? This possibility certainly exists, especially over a
multi-year period. That is, as long as the net savings over several years exceed
the deductible on the associated health insurance policy, the extra costs of a
resulting hospital stay would be paid by that insurance policy, leaving the HSA
account-holder with a net gain. Such a strategy is certainly risky behavior, but
hospitals are filled with people who indulge in a wide variety of risky behaviors,
most of which are far better documented than avoiding or minimizing health care
treatments. Be that as it may, HSAs clearly reflect the increasingly prevalent
ethos of individual control and will resonate with those who want the maximum
freedom of choice.
C. Cost of Health Care
The impact of HSAs on the cost of health care will probably be fairly
minimal. On the one hand, there is the often-quoted aphorism of Milton
Friedman, Nobel Laureate in economics, that "nobody spends somebody else's
money as wisely as he spends his own." 20 3 But how much bargaining power can
individual consumers really wield, acting one patient at a time? To be fair, HSAs
might sensitize American health care consumers to the cost of their health care
and may even clarify the connection between health costs and behaviors that are
within their control. If so, HSAs might in fact moderate the growth in health care
costs,2°4 though this possibility is still conjectural and undoubtedly very long-
term in nature.
In any case, HSAs seem less paternalistic and more respectful of individual
autonomy than do some other employer-created health care initiatives. For
example, some companies decline to hire smokers outright.20 5 Other companies
increase the employee health insurance co-payments of overweight workers.20 6
By comparison to these rather blunt approaches, HSAs are much less dictatorial:
if an employee chooses to keep smoking or overeating, there will be a health care
201. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, A Radical Prescription, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2004, at R3.
202. Id.
203. See John F. Cogan et al., Healthy, Wealthy and Wise, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2004, at A20 (quoting
Milton Friedman).
204. See Ron Lieber, New Way to Curb Medical Costs: Make Employees Feel the Sting, WALL ST. J.,
June 23, 2004, at Al (reporting that HSA-like accounts at a major employer reduced overall medical costs). See
also Susan Lee, A Tax-Code Cure for Ailing Health Care, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2004, at Al 3 ("Since low
coinsurance and deductions are the engine behind rocketing costs and wasteful medical practices, providing
consumers with the incentive to shift to policies with high coinsurance and deductibles is an elegant remedy.").
205. See Howard M. Leichter, "Evil Habits" and "Personal Choices": Assigning Responsibility for
Health in the 20th Century, 81 MILBANK Q. 603, 609 (2003); Kris Maher, Companies are Closing Doors on
Job Applicants Who Smoke, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at B6.
206. Leichter, supra note 205, at 609.
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cost and the employee will pay it out of his or her HSA. Thus, HSAs are more
like differential insurance rates for nonsmokers and smokers in this respect: make
your choice and pay the price.
On the other hand, most of the dollars spent on health care currently are not
really subject to the sort of discipline that HSAs stimulate. A study of Americans
aged 18-64 years with employment-based health insurance revealed that 95% of
all health care costs were incurred by only 50% of this population.2 °7 The
distribution of costs was even more skewed:








In other words, more than three-quarters of all health care costs that were
incurred by this group were attributable to the sickest quintile, and a full fifth of
such costs was incurred by the sickest one percent. Within this top one percent,
moreover, almost two-thirds of their costs represented charges for inpatient
hospital stays 2°9-the sort of expenditures that would be covered by the high-
deductible insurance policies that are associated with HSAs, rather than by the
HSAs themselves. Furthermore, 75% of all health care costs are spent by persons
who incur more than $6,000 of such costs in that year,2 an amount in excess of
the maximum out-of-pocket limit that is allowed for HSA-associated health
insurance plans.21 The potential of HSAs to effect major declines in health care
consumption, in other words, is rather circumscribed.
Where the impact of HSAs might be more likely felt, however, is in the
nature of health insurance. HSAs might bring health insurance more in line with
other types of insurance, rather than an arrangement to prepay most health costs,
including expenditures that are highly predictable. That is, we do not use
automobile insurance to cover engine tune-ups, and we do not file home
insurance claims when the gutters must be cleaned. Realigning Americans'
expectations of what health insurance should cover with more general
conceptions of insurance might encourage those people who presently have no
health insurance to purchase high-deductible coverage for major medical
207. Paul Fronstin, Can "Consumerism" Slow the Rate of Health Benefit Cost Increases?, EMP. BEN.
RES. INST. BRIEF No. 247 (July 2002), at 17.
208. Adapted by author from data in footnote 207 at 18.
209. Fronstin, supra note 207, at 19.
210. Sullivan, supra note 167, at 306.
211. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (West 2004) ($5,000 for self-only coverage).
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episodes.212 This population would still need to use its own money for ordinary
medical costs, but that is precisely the structure that HSAs create for people with
employer-provided health insurance.
In any case, the days of comprehensive low-deductible health insurance
policies appear limited. The increasing prevalence of managed care
arrangements 213 has largely supplanted this mechanism as a means of financing
ordinary health care costs. Where low-deductible policies are still offered,
employers have been increasing the portion of the premiums that are paid by the
employees, raising deductibles, and expanding co-payment obligations. 4 HSAs
merely make clear a development that is already underway-namely, more
personal responsibility for the financial implications of one's health care.
VII. CONCLUSION
Most Americans of pre-retirement age obtain their health insurance through
their place of employment. This reality began as an accident of history, but it has
been bolstered since that time by federal tax policy. That policy, in turn, has
largely anesthetized most employees to the real costs of health insurance and the
effect of lifestyle choices and personal habits on the consumption, as well as the
cost, of health care. One cannot change one's behavior in response to what one
does not see.
The newly created Health Savings Accounts seek to alter this paradigm by
making Americans conscious about the cost of the health care services that they
use. Combining a "high deductible" insurance plan to cover major health care
expenditures with an account that they control and own, HSAs make clear that
health care is not a free good and that economic trade-offs affect this key service
just like other important purchases. Proponents of these accounts are virtually
messianic in their enthusiasm for this radically different approach to health care
in the United States. President George W. Bush declared, "I believe that the best
health care policy is one that entrusts and empowers consumers. [With a HSA,]
you're the decisionmaker, not a bureaucrat.21 5 Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Dennis Hastert, observed that HSAs "will revolutionize the
health care market in this country, giving consumers better health care at a lower
212. See Laura Trueman, HSAs Spread Quickly, Surprise Critics, Health Care News, Sept. 2004, at 1, 4
(reporting that 43% of HSA applicants had no prior health insurance).
213. See Paul Wallace, A Survey of Health-Care Finance: Treating the Symptoms, ECONOMIST, July 17,
2004, at 15 (92% of workers with employer-provided health insurance participate in managed care plans).
214. See, e.g., Fuhrmans, supra note 201; PARK, supra note 149, at 13.
215. See Dustin Stamper & Karla L. Miller, HSA Backers Continue Campaign for Crane Bill, 102 TAX
NOTES 1465, 1465-66 (2004) (quoting President George W. Bush).
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price. 21 6 Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich claimed that creation of HSAs
was "the single most important change in health-care policy in 60 years.
2 17
These sentiments may be overstated, but the movement towards greater
personal responsibility in health care is clearly here to stay, and HSAs will only
accelerate it further. Rather than harsh and restrictive edicts from employers,
HSAs empower consumers to decide for themselves how they will spend their
health care dollars and on what. The associated high-deductible insurance
policies still protect them against the cost of major medical calamities, but the
key message remains: use health care funds prudently, for they are ultimately
your own resources.
216. 149 CONG. REC. H12881 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2003).
217. Newt Gingrich, The Medicare Bill: A Solid Platform for Reviving Health Care, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 2003, at G1.
